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Abstract!!
!
As evidence regarding the consequences of climate change grows, the need to act cooperatively 
becomes increasingly apparent. International environmental agreements are one of many means 
being pursued to improve environmental management and combat climate change at large. This 
study examines factors that influence international environmental treaty participation among 
European countries. Using panel data on 35 European countries for 1980-1999, joint treaty 
participation is estimated as a function of various globalization variables with specific attention 
given to the effects of cross-border air pollution, foreign direct investment, and trade. These 
results suggest that cross-border air pollution does increase cooperation even after controlling for 
distance between countries. Specifically, these results suggest that countries that receive more 
cross-border pollution from another country (than they themselves send there) are more likely to 
jointly ratify environmental treaties with that country.  !
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Chapter!1:!Introduction!
 
Globalization improves the lives of many, whether through access to better 
economic opportunities, education, healthcare, or political systems. Yet it also harms the 
lives of many, and there is much debate about its social, economic, and environmental 
implications. One element of this debate concerns the effect of increased international 
commerce on the environment. Central to the relationship between international 
commerce and the environment are the implications of competition in environmental 
policy for foreign direct investment (FDI). As firms become mobile, competition between 
host countries can lead to sub-optimal emissions taxes. As discussed by Rauscher (1995, 
1997), if firms seek to avoid emissions taxes (the “pollution haven effect”), governments 
may respond by lowering emissions taxes in order to attract FDI (the “race to the 
bottom”). This inefficiency creates incentive to coordinate environmental standards across 
countries, which can increase emissions tax rates and lower worldwide pollution levels 
(Davies and Naughton 2014). Set in this context, international environmental agreements 
(IEAs) may play an important role in shaping economic and environmental outcomes.   
This study examines the effects of cross-border air pollution and international 
commerce on joint environmental treaty participation among European countries. I use 
regression analysis to answer the question, how does cross-border air pollution of sulfur 
oxides and nitrogen oxides affect joint environmental treaty participation between 
countries? Using panel data on European country pairs, this study estimates treaty 
!
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participation as a function of various globalization variables, with specific attention 
given to the effects of cross-border air pollution, FDI, and trade on treaty participation.  
While previous studies have considered international competition in environmental 
policy and others have examined the relationship between FDI and the environment, few 
have fully integrated these two ideas. This paper provides an empirical contribution 
towards filling this gap. Furthermore, while other studies have examined factors that 
influence environmental treaty participation by individual countries, none have used cross-
border air pollution data to study cooperation between countries via joint environmental 
treaty participation.1 By using data on country pairs, this study is able to focus on factors 
that drive environmental cooperation between countries as opposed to treaty participation 
by individual countries. Understanding the incentives behind joint treaty participation can 
provide insight regarding the contentious relationship between globalization and the 
environment, particularly with respect to the roles of international commerce and 
environmental policy. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
relationship between globalization, climate change, and international environmental 
agreements. Chapter 3 reviews theoretical and empirical literature on IEA effectiveness 
and participation, and discusses a theoretical model of pollution tax competition. Chapter 
4 describes the empirical approach and data used. Chapter 5 discusses empirical results, 
and Chapter 6 concludes and discusses possibilities for future research. In Chapter 7, I 
offer additional comments on the relationship between international commerce and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Roberts et al. (2004) and Egger et al. (2011) estimate models determining treaty participation by 
individual countries, but neither of theses studies allow for strategic interactions between 
countries. 
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environment within the context of globalization and climate change, as well as make 
suggestions as to what can be done—beyond participation in environmental agreements—
to address climate change and other social, economic, and environmental issues within 
this context. 
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Chapter!2:!Globalization!and!the!Environment:!the!case!for!IEAs!
 
2.1!Global!Pollution!and!Climate!Change!!
!
In Making Globalization Work, former chief economist at the World Bank and 
Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2006, 161) suggests that “the world is 
currently engaged in a grand experiment, studying what happens when you release carbon 
dioxide and certain other gases into the atmosphere in larger and larger amounts.” We 
have never done this before, and there is consensus among scientists that human-driven 
climate change is well outside the earth’s natural range of climate variability (IPCC 2007). 
Global warming stems from the phenomenon that when sunlight hits the earth’s surface it 
is reflected back into the atmosphere and absorbed by naturally present gases, including 
carbon dioxide. This trapped sunlight heats the atmosphere and the earth’s surface, 
creating a ‘greenhouse effect.’ Without these gases it is estimated that the earth’s 
temperature would be approximately 30 to 40 degrees Celsius cooler and the planet could 
not sustain life as we know it (IPCC 2007).2 While this natural warming process is needed 
for life on earth, human activity disrupts the level of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere, which increases global warming and contributes to climate change.  
Combatting climate change has become a global priority, and as such, a wide range 
of actions is being taken to mitigate its causes and develop solutions.  Anthropogenic 
emissions and other sources of environmental degradation can be addressed, in part, 
through international environmental agreements. For example, the Kyoto Protocol and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 To preserve our planet as we know it, scientists argue we must reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere from its current levels of 400 parts per million to below 350 ppm (McKibben 2007).  
!
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Montreal Protocol set targets for emissions of GHGs and other harmful substances such 
as chlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons. These treaties address emissions 
reductions as well as carbon capture and sequestration. Although forests and oceans are 
natural carbon sinks, rising temperatures reduce their ability to sequester carbon (EPA 
2014a). This creates a positive feedback loop—global warming reduces the capacity of 
carbon sinks, which increases carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, which in turn leads 
to more global warming. Climate change is thought to be driven by many positive 
feedback loops. This process has far-reaching consequences and international 
environmental agreements are one of the means by which countries attempt to address 
them.   
 
2.2!Local!and!Regional!Pollution!
!
While much of the research and debate about climate change focuses on carbon 
dioxide levels in the atmosphere, it is also important to study local and regional air 
pollutants such as sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides. Doing so can provide insight 
regarding factors that may influence strategic interaction between countries. Sulfur oxides 
(SOX) refer to many types of sulfur and oxygen containing compounds, including sulfur 
dioxide. In air pollution, sulfur dioxide is a toxic gas released by various industrial 
processes, including coal-fired power plants, and produced naturally by volcanoes (EPA 
2014b). Nitrogen oxides (NOX) refer to nitrogen and oxygen containing compounds, 
specifically nitrogen dioxide and nitric oxide. NOX is a byproduct of combustion, such as 
by automobile engines and fossil fuel power plants, and is also produced naturally during 
!
!
6!
6!
the electrical discharges of lightning (EPA 2014c). Together, SOX and NOX are 
byproducts of industrial production that react with water molecules and other compounds 
in the atmosphere to form smog and acid rain. These pollutants can travel great distances, 
affecting the country of origin and other countries as well.   
The cross-border nature of SOX and NOX emissions provides grounds for countries 
to strategically interact via environmental treaties. Three international environmental 
agreements are in place to control SOX and NOX emissions.3 The 1985 Helsinki Protocol is 
a protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to regulate SOX 
emissions. It required a 30 percent reduction of the 1980 SOX emissions by 1990 and a 50 
percent reduction by 1993 for participating countries. The 1994 Oslo Protocol 
supplements the Helsinki Protocol by setting individual SOX reduction targets for each 
country and a longer timeline—extending the target dates from 2000 to 2010. Regarding 
NOX emissions, the 1988 Sofia Protocol called for participating countries to reduce their 
emissions to 1987 levels by 1994, and provided other guidelines for controlling emissions. 
Although these agreements were written and signed at international meetings, countries 
are not bound by an agreement until they ratify it. Moreover, countries may withdraw 
from ratified agreements without legal consequence, which makes studying the incentives 
behind treaty participation all the more important. Examining the relationship between 
international commerce and the environment is one mean of doing so. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Additional information on the environmental agreements used for the empirical analyses in this 
study can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
!
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2.3!International!Commerce!and!the!Environment!
!
Globalization allows countries to strategically interact—whether in response to 
transboundary environmental issues, through international commerce, or otherwise. One 
of the largest players influencing the nature of globalization—and the relationship with the 
environment—is the transnational corporation (TNC). While household names like Wal-
Mart, Apple, Exxon-Mobil, and General Electric are some of the world’s most visible 
TNCs, there are thousands of TNCs and hundreds of thousands of affiliates operating 
across the globe. Between 1970 and 2007, the number of TNC parent firms increased 
more than tenfold from about 7,000 to over 79,000, with nearly 800,000 foreign affiliates 
(UNCTAD, 2008). These firms make up approximately one-tenth of world GDP and one-
third of total world exports (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). Growth in the number of TNCs 
has also translated into rising FDI, which is investment made by a corporation in a home 
country into a host country. FDI flows have expanded rapidly from $82 billion in 1982 to 
a peak of $2.3 trillion in 2007 prior to the global financial crisis. In 2008, global FDI 
flows were approximately $1.8 trillion (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). Like international 
trade, FDI can play a crucial role regarding how international commerce affects 
environmental management issues. 
Economic literature on the relationship between international commerce and the 
environment came in two waves, with an initial surge in the 1970s and renewed interest in 
the 1990s, which was fueled by policy debates over the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. A main concern 
expressed in early work was that reducing barriers to trade and FDI would lead to 
!
!
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industrial flight from rich to poor countries as well as the creation of pollution havens in 
countries with lower environmental standards (Baumol 1971; Siebert 1977). Industrial 
flight occurs when a country raises its environmental standards, which then triggers the 
relocation of industry and FDI to countries with lower standards. Pollution havens arise 
when a country sets inefficiently low environmental standards in order to attract FDI, 
which leads industry to relocate and save on production costs. Pollution havens and 
industrial flight are thus two sides of the same coin. Together they can cause a ‘regulatory 
chill,’ which occurs when countries fail to raise environmental standards for fear of losing 
out on trade and investment opportunities (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). For example, 
governments could tailor their emissions tax policies to attract FDI, which may come at 
the expense of their environment. These issues can leave countries with weak political 
institutions and domestic economies particularly vulnerable to environmental and labor 
abuses. Further discussion of the relationship between international commerce and the 
environment can be found in Chapter 7. 
A related body of literature examines international environmental treaty 
participation among countries. Much of this literature focuses on the incentives for 
countries to cooperate via environmental treaties while other literature examines treaty 
effectiveness as opposed to participation. The next chapter discusses theoretical and 
empirical work on IEA effectiveness and participation, as well as a theoretical model of 
pollution tax competition.  
 
 
!
!
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Chapter!3:!Literature!Review!!
 
3.1!Introduction!
!
This chapter discusses theoretical and empirical work on IEA effectiveness and 
participation. I begin by discussing the economic theory of environmental agreements and 
empirical work on IEA effectiveness. I then discuss theoretical literature on IEA 
participation—including a theoretical model of emission tax competition—which together 
provides a theoretical basis for countries to cooperate via IEAs. Finally, I discuss 
empirical work on IEA participation with specific attention given to the roles of 
international commerce and cross-border air pollution as determinants of participation.  
 
3.2!IEA!Effectiveness:!Theory!and!Evidence!
!
 In economic theory, the environment is often characterized as a common resource. 
This classification can create a prisoners’ dilemma and subsequently a tragedy of the 
commons in which the actions of self-interested individuals ultimately leads to the abuse 
of the common resource in question. While environmental agreements seek to combat 
such abuses, enforcing them can be difficult due to the prisoners’ dilemma associated with 
IEA participation. Much of the literature on IEA participation focuses on the incentives 
for countries to cooperate via IEAs, while other literature examines treaty effectiveness as 
opposed to participation. Most theoretical economic models on treaty effectiveness 
suggest that IEAs fail at reducing emissions below business-as-usual levels (Barrett 
1994a, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Finus and Maus 2008). This is largely due to 
!
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the voluntary nature of IEAs, their lack of enforceability, and the free rider problem 
associated with other countries’ abatement efforts (Egger at al. 2011; Kellenberg and 
Levinson 2014).  
Empirical work on IEA effectiveness provides mixed support for these theories.4 
Among studies that employ multiple regression analysis regarding the effectiveness of the 
Helsinki, Oslo, and Sofia Protocols, Murdoch et al. (1997) found that the Helsinki 
Protocol helped lower sulfur emissions but the Sofia Protocol did not affect NOX 
emissions.5 Murdoch et al. (1997) used a spatial lag model for data on 25 European 
countries from 1980-1990. In contrast, Naughton (2010) found no effect of the Helsinki or 
Oslo Protocols on sulfur emissions but found that the Sofia Protocol was effective at 
reducing NOX emissions in Europe. Naughton (2010) also used a spatial lag model using 
two-stage least squares as well as year and country fixed effects for 16 European countries 
from 1980-2000. Maddison (2006) found that both the Helsinki and Sofia Protocols 
decreased per capita emissions for countries that ratified the treaties. Maddison (2006) 
used OLS and a spatial mixed model for data on 135 countries from 1990-1995.  
Other studies that use multiple regression analysis also find varying degrees of 
effectiveness for the Helsinki, Oslo, and Sofia Protocols. Using OLS, fixed effects, and 
random effects for 19 European countries from 1980-1994, Ringquist and Kostadinova 
(2005) found that the Helsinki Protocol had no effect on sulfur emissions reduction in 
Europe. Similarly, Aakvik and Tjøtta (2011) use a difference-in-difference model on data 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Houghton and Naughton (2014) for a detailed review of empirical literature on IEA 
effectiveness. !
5 The Helsinki and Oslo Protocols regulate sulfur emissions in Europe while the Sofia Protocol 
regulates NOX emissions. 
!
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for 30 European countries from 1960-2002 to provide empirical evidence that neither 
the Helsinki nor Oslo Protocols are effective at reducing emissions once country-specific 
trends are taken into consideration. In contrast, Bratberg et al. (2005) find evidence that 
the Sofia Protocol increased NOX emissions reduction by 2.1%, using a difference-in-
difference model for 23 European countries from 1980-1996. Other studies reviewed by 
Houghton and Naughton (2014) and reported in Table A3 of Appendix A employ trend 
analyses to evaluate IEA effectiveness. Although each of the five studies evaluates a 
different IEA, all found evidence that IEAs are successful. See Appendix A for more 
information on empirical work on IEA effectiveness. Table A1 lists IEAs that have been 
evaluated by empirical studies, while Tables A2 and A3 outline empirical studies that 
employ multiple regression and trend analyses, respectively. 
Clearly, empirical work on IEA enforcement provides mixed support for economic 
theories about IEA effectiveness. Kellenberg and Levinson (2014), who found that the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal was ineffective at reducing waste shipments among countries, argue that 
studying treaty effectiveness is challenging for a number of reasons. First, it is often the 
case that limited data are available from before IEAs were enacted, which limits 
researchers’ ability to make before-and-after comparisons to evaluate treaty effectiveness. 
It is also difficult to measure counter-factual outcomes; that is, it is difficult to say what 
would have happened without a treaty in place. Regardless of IEA effectiveness, however, 
countries continue to enter into IEAs across the globe with countries having negotiated 
more than 1,200 multilateral environmental agreements, 1,500 bilateral environmental 
!
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agreements, and nearly 250 other environmental agreements (Mitchell 2002-2008). The 
surge in IEA membership is at odds with economic theory on IEA effectiveness, so the 
question remains as to why countries continue to participate.  
 
3.3!IEA!Participation:!Theory!and!Evidence!
!
In contrast to evaluating treaty effectiveness, a related body of literature focuses on 
the incentives for countries to participate in IEAs. Many of these incentives are related to 
international commerce—specifically foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade—and 
cross-border pollution between countries. Research by Rose and Spiegel (2009) suggests 
that membership in IEAs has surged because joining an IEA acts as a signaling effect for 
other forms of cooperation, particularly with respect to economic exchange. They 
hypothesize that countries are more willing to voluntarily submit to potentially costly 
environmental regulations if such participation can influence other outcomes such as 
membership in trade, investment, or political agreements. They employ a cross-sectional 
gravity model to test this theory empirically, and find that participation in IEAs is 
positively associated with the international exchange of assets. Using a sample of 221 
country pairs from 2001 to 2003, Rose and Spiegel (2009) find evidence of increased 
cross-holdings of assets by country pairs if a bilateral environmental agreement is in place. 
That is, country pairs may raise bilateral capital flows if they are participating in a 
bilateral environmental agreement. If the country pair has a joint interest in the 
environment, then they should be able to maintain high levels of cross-holdings of assets, 
which can be reduced if one of the countries violates the IEA. Moreover, their research 
!
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suggests this result is consistent when both bilateral and multilateral environmental 
agreements are in place, which supports the idea that positive spillovers exist between 
environmental cooperation via joint IEA ratification and economic exchange.  
Egger et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion about the relationship between 
international commerce and environmental cooperation. They focus on the role of a 
country’s international openness through trade and investment policies as indicators of 
participation in IEAs. Their findings support the theory that trade and investment 
liberalization increase IEA participation. In particular, they find that wealthier countries 
with a stronger leaning toward trade and investment liberalization are more likely than 
other countries to submit themselves to voluntary environmental standards—including 
emissions reduction—through membership in IEAs. However, their model does not 
consider strategic interactions between countries by way of joint treaty participation by 
country pairs, as they focus on whether openness to trade and investment liberalization are 
determinants of treaty participation by individual countries.  
Other literature examines whether states or countries experiencing cross-border 
pollution have incentive to cooperate to reduce environmental degradation (Fredriksson 
and Millimet 2002; Fredriksson et al. 2004; Levinson (2003); Davies and Naughton 2014). 
Of the studies that use panel data, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Fredriksson et al. 
(2004), and Levinson (2003) find evidence that US states compete in environmental 
policy. Davies and Naughton (2014) employ a comparable empirical approach but use 
international data to examine the effect of cross-border pollution on international 
environmental treaty participation. While Davies and Naughton (2014) use weighting 
!
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schemes that decline in distance to proxy for cross-border pollution, the empirical 
model in this study uses pollution transfer coefficients to estimate joint treaty participation 
as a function of cross-border pollution and other explanatory variables.6 Whereas distance 
is constant and symmetric between countries and is only a proxy for air pollution 
spillovers, the pollution transfer coefficient measures actual pollution spillover and 
accounts for the asymmetric nature of cross-border pollution between countries.7 Similar 
to Davies and Naughton (2014), this study also considers competition for capital in 
relation to environmental treaty participation. This approach is informed by Davies and 
Naughton’s (2014) theoretical model of emissions tax competition, which integrates ideas 
about competition in international environmental policy with ideas about the relationship 
between FDI and the environment, and is discussed below. 
 
3.4!Theoretical!Model!of!Emissions!Tax!Competition!
!
Much of the theoretical literature on IEAs examines emissions tax policies, and 
poses the question of whether countries or states that experience cross-border pollution 
spillovers have incentive to cooperate in order to reduce overall environmental 
degradation (Davies and Naughton 2014; Fredriksson et al. 2004; Mitchell 2003). The 
theoretical framework for my thesis is based on Davies and Naughton (2014). If 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Regarding the relationship between distance and cross-border pollution, this study found that 
distance is negatively correlated with both the SOX and NOX pollution transfer coefficients. For the 
data used in this study, there is a negative correlation of -.2269 between distance and the SOX 
transfer coefficient, and a negative correlation of -.2302 between distance and the NOX transfer 
coefficient.  
7 Cross-border air pollution between countries is not symmetric. As such, the transfer coefficients 
used in the empirical analyses in this study allow for pollution spillover from country i to country j 
that are not equal to pollution spillover from country j to country i. 
!
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competition for FDI leads to inefficiently low emissions taxes, then their theoretical 
framework suggests that high cross-border pollution increases benefits to cooperation in 
emissions taxes.  
Davies and Naughton (2014) employ a two-country model of tax competition for 
FDI, which gives rise to best response emissions tax functions.8 These functions are 
depicted on Figure 1 where t(t*) represents the home country’s best response to the host 
country’s tax, t*, and t*(t) represents the host country’s best response to the home 
country’s tax, t.9 At the initial level of cross-border air pollution, measured by the transfer 
coefficient a=a1, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium occurs at point A while the 
cooperative outcome is at point C. Therefore, gains to cooperation can be thought of as 
moving from point A to C. Davies and Naughton’s (2014) theoretical framework suggests 
that an increase of the transfer coefficient to a=a2 will lead to even more competition in 
emissions taxes with the Nash outcome represented by point B.10 Furthermore, they find 
that a higher transfer coefficient leads to higher cooperative tax rates, which is represented 
by point D. Therefore, as the emissions transfer coefficient increases, gains from 
cooperation are represented by the difference between points B and D. This result is 
similar to that of Cremer and Gahvari (2004), who found that cooperation in emissions 
taxes and commodity taxes above the Nash equilibrium level by countries experiencing 
cross-border pollution led to lower aggregate emissions and higher overall welfare. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 This theoretical framework makes some fairly restrictive functional form assumptions by 
necessity. General theories of tax competition for FDI quickly lead to ambiguities that limit their 
usefulness (see Wilson 1999, Gresik 2001). 
9 The two-country models of FDI assume that one of the two countries is the source of FDI (the 
home country) and the other country is the host of FDI. 
10 With higher cross-border pollution the countries would like the benefits of hosting FDI given 
that they end up suffering much of the costs of emissions anyway.  
!
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The contribution of my thesis is empirical in nature. In their empirical model, 
Davies and Naughton (2014) proxy for cross-border pollution using different weighting 
schemes that were declining in distance, whereas my empirical model uses actual 
emissions transfer coefficients alongside distance. 
 
Figure 1. Best-response emissions tax rates as a rises from a1 to a2 
 
Source: Davies and Naughton (2014) 
Note: Increasing emissions transfer coefficient (a1 to a2) increases the gap between the 
competitive Nash equilibrium outcome (A to B) and cooperative outcome (C to D).
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While Davies and Naughton’s (2014) theoretical model may help explain regional 
IEA participation in which cross-border air pollution exists, it does not explain 
participation in IEAs when cross-border pollution is not an issue or for IEAs relating to 
global pollutants such as carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases. Although the positive 
spillover effect described by Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Egger et al. (2011) also 
provides some theoretical and empirical basis for IEA participation, further review of 
empirical work on IEA participation is necessary.  
 
3.5!IEA!Participation:!Additional!Empirical!Evidence!
 
Much of the empirical work on IEA formation and participation focuses on either 
a single environmental agreement (bilateral or otherwise), a subset of agreements, or on a 
small subset of countries or regions. For example, Beron et al. (2003) and Murdoch et al. 
(2003) use spatial probit models to estimate strategic interaction between countries in the 
ratification of the Montreal and Helsinki Protocols, respectively. Beron et al. (2003) 
constructed a spatial lag using trade-based, emissions-based, and contiguity weighing 
schemes for data on the 89 largest countries in the world. They examine what they refer 
to as the ‘power’ effect to determine whether an individual nation’s decision to ratify the 
protocol was influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. They 
hypothesized that if a nation felt strongly about ratifying a particular treaty, that country 
would not only ratify the treaty but also try to influence other countries to ratify it as well. 
However, they found no statistically significant evidence to support this. Beron et al. 
(2003) did find evidence that countries with stronger civil and political institutions were 
more likely to ratify the Montreal Protocol. This result is consistent with the theory that if 
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citizens prefer strong environmental standards, environmental treaty participation should 
increase when strong civil and political institutions are in place (Naughton 2010).  
Murdoch et al. (2003) estimate strategic interactions in the ratification of the Helsinki 
Protocol by using emissions-based weights for a cross-section of 25 European countries 
from 1980 to 1990. They model treaty participation as a two-stage game in which 
countries first decide whether or not to ratify the protocol, and then decide their level of 
participation by way of sulfur emissions reduction. Although the authors found positive 
and statistically significant interaction effects in the ratification stage of the game, they 
also observed that strategic responses by countries may differ across the different stages 
of the game.  
 Davies and Naughton (2014) improve on the studies by Beron et al. (2003) and 
Murdoch et al. (2003) in two key ways. First, they use panel data on 139 countries over a 
20-year period from 1980 to 1999. Other studies that use panel data to estimate strategic 
interaction in environmental policy employ US state level data.11 Davies and Naughton 
(2014) use an empirical approach similar to Fredriksson et al. (2004), who found that US 
states compete in environmental stringency as measured by an index developed by 
Levinson (2001) to measure state-level environmental compliance costs. Second, Davies 
and Naughton (2014) employ a more comprehensive measure of international 
environmental cooperation by using data on 110 treaties instead of just the Montreal or 
Helsinki Protocols. Davies and Naughton’s (2014) theoretical model of emissions tax 
competition informs their empirical approach. They use different weighting schemes that 
are declining in distance to proxy for cross-border air pollution. They hypothesize that in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), Levinson (2003), and Fredriksson et al. (2004) all find that 
US states compete in environmental stringency. 
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the presence of cross-border air pollution, proximate countries have greater incentives to 
cooperate via jointly ratified IEAs. They find statistically significant evidence of spatial 
spillovers in treaty participation among proximate countries. 
 Similar to Rose and Spiegel (2009), who found that openness to environmental 
cooperation acts as a signal for economic exchange, Davies and Naughton (2014) 
hypothesize that countries with higher trade and FDI will participate in more 
environmental treaties. Although they find statistical evidence that increasing trade 
increases IEA participation, their evidence regarding the effect of FDI on IEA 
participation is mixed. They also find that strategic responses in IEA participation are 
most evident in regional agreements, and vary between OECD and non-OECD countries. 
These results provide partial support for their emissions tax competition theory, and 
match the mixed results produced by other empirical work on IEA participation and 
effectiveness. Thus, there is still much room for further empirical research to test related 
theories. 
The next chapter describes the empirical approach and data used in this study to 
test the hypothesis that cross-border air pollution increases cooperation between countries 
as measured by jointly ratified IEAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
20!
20!
Chapter!4:!Empirical!Approach!!
 
4.1!Empirical!Model!
!
The empirical model used in this study is informed by Davies and Naughton’s 
(2014) theoretical model of emissions tax competition. If competition among countries 
for FDI leads to inefficiently low emissions taxes, then data on environmental treaty 
participation should support the hypothesis that countries will gain from environmental 
cooperation. From previous literature, the incentive to cooperate increases as cross-border 
pollution increases (Davies and Naughton 2014). While Davies and Naughton (2014) 
used distance between countries to proxy for cross-border pollution, this study uses a 
cross-border pollution variable alongside distance. This allows me to examine the effect 
of cross-border pollution on treaty participation while controlling for distance. I expect 
countries that receive more cross-border pollution from another country (than they 
themselves send there) to be more likely to jointly ratify environmental treaties with that 
country. Similarly, if countries send more cross-border pollution to another country than 
they themselves receive from that country, they are expected be less likely to jointly 
ratify environmental treaties with that country. 
An OLS model is estimated for the treaty cooperation index between countries i 
and j in year t as follows:  
!"(!"#$%!"#) = !!! + !!!"#$%&'"()*!" + !!!"(!"#!")!+!!!!"#$%&'(!" +
!!!!"(!"#!")+ !!!"(!"#$%&'!")+ !!!!"(!"#$%&'($)*(!")+
!!!!"(!"#$%&'(")!")+ !!!"##$%&!" + !!" + !!! + !!"#      (1) 
where Ln(Indexijt) is the natural log of the number of treaties jointly ratified by each i-j 
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country pair in year t, TransferSOXji is the air pollution transfer coefficients for SOX from 
country j to i, and Ln(SOxit) are country level SOX  emissions for country i in year t. I 
estimate a separate model using NOX pollution transfer coefficients and country level 
emissions (TransferNOxji and Ln(NOxit), respectively).ij captures country pair fixed 
effects controlling for time-invariant country pair characteristics, while γt captures year 
fixed effects. ε is the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) error term, which 
represents idiosyncratic shocks uncorrelated across countries and over time. Each i-j 
country pair is included twice, as each country is included once as country i and again as 
country j. Distanceij is not included in the country pair fixed effects model, as it is 
symmetric and constant between country pairs over time. Although the pollution transfer 
coefficient is also constant over time, it is not symmetric between country pairs. That is, 
the pollution transfer coefficient from country i to j differs from the transfer coefficient 
from country j to i. As such, the transfer coefficient can be included in the country pair 
fixed effects model. 
Following the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 3, I predict a positive 
coefficient on the pollution transfer coefficient. Joint treaty participation by country i 
with country j is expected to increase as country i receives more cross-border pollution 
from country j (than country i sends to country j). Presumably, if all spillovers were 
captured by the transfer coefficient then distance should not matter to treaty participation. 
While I expect the pollution transfer coefficient to have a positive effect on joint treaty 
participation, previous literature suggests that country level emissions have an ambiguous 
effect on environmental treaty participation. Theory discussed in Beron et al. (2003) and 
Egger et al. (2011) suggests that countries with higher emissions will participate in fewer 
!
!
22!
22!
environmental treaties but empirical work offers mixed support for this. For example, 
Beron et al. (2003) hypothesize that countries with higher country level emissions will 
participate in fewer environmental treaties but find no statistically significant evidence of 
this in their empirical analysis. Additionally, Egger et al. (2011) find that countries with 
higher emissions are less likely to commit to emissions reduction through participation in 
environmental treaties, but this effect is economically small. 
While the pollution transfer coefficient and distance are constant over time, the 
remaining independent variables vary by country and across time. Ln(FDIit) is the natural 
log of total inward FDI flow to country i at time t. Considering the theoretical tax 
competition model developed by Davies and Naughton (2014) and discussed in Chapter 
3, I anticipate a positive coefficient on FDI. Some previous research (e.g. Cole at al. 
2006, Rose and Spiegel 2009, Davies and Naughton 2014) suggests that FDI also 
responds to environmental regulation. I believe that is not an issue in my model because 
the environmental regulation variable is bilateral in nature rather than a more general 
measure of environmental regulation. 
The effect of trade on joint treaty participation is estimated using Ln(Exportsit), 
which is the natural log of country i’s exports. According to previous literature, trade is 
often an indicator of cooperation so I expect countries with higher exports to participate 
in more IEAs, which will result in a positive coefficient on Ln(Exportsit). Other 
explanatory variables include GDP per capita, population, and a variable that measures 
political freedom. Ln(GDPpercapitait) is the natural log of GDP per capita, 
Ln(Populationit) is the natural log of population in year t, and Freedomit is an index 
variable that measures political freedom in country i. Together, per capita GDP and 
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population control for size of the economy and average income. Following other studies, 
I expect to find that large economies are more likely to participate in international 
treaties. Therefore, positive coefficients are expected for Ln(GDPpercapitait) and 
Ln(Populationit). Previous studies also find that if citizens prefer strong environmental 
standards, then political freedom should increase environmental treaty participation. As 
such, I anticipate a positive relationship between Freedomit and IEA participation. 
In addition to the model specification that includes total inward FDI, separate 
models are estimated using bilateral inward FDI between i-j country pairs. These 
specifications are shown in section 5.3 of the results chapter. 
 
4.2!Data 
Treaty)Participation)Index!
!
This study uses an unbalanced panel dataset for 35 European countries forming 
1,190 country pairs for 1980 to 1999.12 The dependent variable in the model is the natural 
log of the number of treaties jointly ratified by each i-j country pair in the dataset. I use 
ratified treaties instead of signed treaties because some treaties are signed but never 
ratified, and therefore do not go into effect. Treaty participation data are provided by 
Mitchell (2002-2008) through the International Environmental Agreements Database 
Project. Although data are available for more than 1,190 multilateral environmental 
agreements, 1,500 bilateral environmental agreements, and 250 other environmental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Countries included in the dataset are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom. 
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agreements, I use data for 110 treaties that have explicit environmental targets or 
requirements to be met by participating countries.13 A detailed list of these 110 treaties 
including scope, type, and membership level for 1980, 1990, and 1999 can be found in 
Appendix B. Treaty types are also summarized in Appendix B. The treaties included in 
the study have wide application from air pollution and climate change to marine 
environment and nature. The use of a wide set of treaties presumes that in some cases 
bilateral pairs have more at stake in one environmental realm than in another and allows 
for the possibility that each country pair is most likely to cooperate in treaties most 
pertinent for that pair. 
It is important to note that not all environmental treaties are of equal importance, I 
recognize, so summing the number of jointly ratified treaties is only a crude method for 
estimating environmental cooperation between countries. Future work on environmental 
treaty participation should consider using a more careful weighting of participation in 
different treaties. For the purpose of this study, however, joint treaty participation in these 
110 treaties is used as a proxy variable to estimate environmental cooperation between 
country pairs.  
 
Pollution Transfer Coefficients, Distance, and Emissions 
!
Data for the pollution transfer coefficients are maintained by the Center on 
Emission Inventories and Projections (CEIP), which is part of the European Monitoring 
and Evaluation Programme (EMEP 2005). EMEP is a scientifically based and policy 
driven program under the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 These are the same 110 treaties used by Davies and Naughton (2014) and listed in Tables B1 
and B2 of Appendix B. 
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which aims to foster international cooperation to solve transboundary air pollution 
problems. CEIP operates the EMEP emission database, which contains the emissions data 
used in this study. The pollution transfer coefficient measures cross-border air pollution 
of SOX and NOX from country j into country i as a percent of country j’s emissions. Data 
on country level SOX and NOX emissions are measured in gigagrams and are reported by 
the Meteorological Synthesizing Centre West (MSC-W 2002). Distance, which Davies 
and Naughton (2014) used to proxy for cross-border air pollution, is measured as the 
simple distance between the most populated cities for each i-j country pair in the dataset. 
Data on distance between countries is maintained by CEPII, which is a French research 
center in international economics that produces studies, research, and databases on the 
world economy (CEPII 2013).  
 
International Commerce: FDI and Trade 
!
FDI flows are made up of capital provided—either directly or indirectly through 
related enterprises—by a foreign direct investor in a ‘home’ country to an FDI enterprise 
in a ‘host’ country, or capital received from an FDI enterprise in a ‘host’ country by a 
foreign direct investor in a ‘home’ country. The empirical model used in this study is 
informed by Davies and Naughton’s (2014) theoretical model of emissions tax 
competition, which assumes that one of the two countries in the i-j country pair is the 
source of FDI (the home country) and the other country is the host of FDI. FDI that flows 
into a host country from a home country is considered inward FDI or inflow, and FDI 
that flows from a home country to a host country is considered outward FDI or outflow. 
FDI has three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and intra-company loans. 
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Equity capital is the investor’s purchase of shares of an enterprise in another country; 
reinvested earnings comprise the investor’s earnings that are not distributed as dividends 
by affiliates; and intra-company loans (or debts) refer to borrowing and lending between 
foreign direct investors (e.g. parent firms) and affiliates. Total inward FDI flow data for 
each country were obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD 2008) and are measured in constant millions of US dollars. 
Regressions with a limited sample use bilateral FDI flow data maintained by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported in current 
millions of US dollars. Some countries reported negative FDI flows, which indicates that 
at least one of the three components of FDI described above (equity capital, reinvested 
earnings or intra-company loans) is negative and is not offset by positive amounts of the 
other components.14 To account for these negative values, all FDI variables were scaled 
up before logging in order to retain all available observations for analysis (see Table 1). 
World trade flow data are constructed from United Nations trade data by Feenstra et al. 
(2005) and are country i’s exports measured in thousands of constant 2005 US dollars.  
 
Additional Explanatory Variables 
  
GDP per capita and population data come from the Penn World Tables. GDP per 
capita is reported in constant 1996 USD and population is measured in thousands. Data 
on political freedom are from Freedom House (2005) and are the sum of freedom indices 
for each country in the dataset. Freedomit is measured as 14 – (CL+PR), where CL is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See the 2008 World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2008) for additional information about FDI 
flow variables. 
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civil liberties index and PR is the political rights index for country i. CL and PR vary 
between 1 and 7 with High CL and PR indicating low freedom. Table!1 and Table!2, 
shown below, contain variable descriptions and descriptive statistics. 
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Table 1 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Indexijt Number of treaties jointly ratified by i-j country pair  Mitchell (2002-2008)  
Ln(Indexijt) Natural log of Indexijt Mitchell (2002-2008)  
TransferSOxji Sulfur oxides pollution transfer coefficient. Cross-border pollution from country 
j into country i measured as a percent of country j’s emissions 
MSC-W (2002) 
TransferNOxji Nitrogen oxides pollution transfer coefficient. Cross-border pollution from 
country j into country i measured as a percent of country j’s emissions 
MSC-W (2002) 
Ln(SOxit) Natural log of SOxit EMEP (2005) 
Ln(NOxit) Natural log of NOxit EMEP (2005) 
Distanceij Simple distance between most populated cities (1000 km) CEPII (2013) 
   
Ln(FDIit) Natural log of FDIit UNCTAD (FDI 
Database) 
Ln(inward FDIjit) Natural log of inward FDIjit OECD (2013) 
Ln(Exportsit) Natural log of Exportsit Feenstra et al. (2005) 
Ln(GDPpercapitait) Natural log of GDPpercapitait Heston et al. (2002)  
Ln(Populationit) Natural log of Populationit Heston et al. (2002)  
Freedomit 
 
Freedomit is measured as 14 – (CL+PR) where CL is the civil liberties index 
and PR is the political rights index for country i. CL and PR vary between 1 and 
7. High CL and PR indicate low freedom. 
Freedom House (2005) 
   
SOxit Country level sulfur dioxide (SOX), gigagrams EMEP (2005) 
NOxit Country level nitrogen oxides (NOX), gigagrams EMEP (2005) 
FDIit [FDI flow –minimum FDI flow + 1], where FDI flow is in constant millions 
USD. 
UNCTAD (FDI 
Database) 
Inward FDIjit [FDI flow – minimum FDI flow + 1], where FDI flow is bilateral inward FDI 
into country i from country j measured in millions USD, current year 
OECD (2013) 
Exportsit Country i exports, thousands, constant 2005 USD  Feenstra et al. (2005) 
GDPpercapitait Country i GDP per capita, constant 1996 USD Heston et al. (2002) 
Populationit Total country population, thousands Heston et al. (2002) 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Indexijt 11125 21.24 12.09 1 83 
Ln(Indexijt) 11125 2.86 0.696 0 4.42 
TransferSOxji 11125 0.01 0.033 0 0.527 
TransferNOxji 11125 0.01 0.037 0 0.582 
Ln(SOxit) 10420 5.80 1.563 -0.916 8.58 
Ln(NOxit) 10438 5.81 1.243 2.186 8.047 
Distanceij 11125 1.68 0.972 0.060 6.91 
      
Ln(FDIit) 11125 8.33 0.882 0 11.41 
Ln(inward FDIjit) 3651 8.50 0.190 0 10.76 
Ln(Exportsit) 10766 24.31 1.592 18.90 27.40 
Ln(GDP per capitait) 11125 9.34 0.572 7.36 10.23 
Ln(Populationit) 11125 9.34 1.317 5.43 11.91 
Freedomit 11125 10.20 2.498 2 12 
      
SOxit 10420 838.48 1033 0.4 5321 
NOxit 10438 652.06 738 8.9 3123 
FDIit 11125 6525.63 9892 1 90069 
Inward FDIjit 3651 4975.50 1192 1 47259 
Exportsit 10766 9.28E+10 1.31E+11 1.61E+08 7.95E+11 
GDP per capitait 11125 13213 6536 1.57E+03 27623 
Populationit 11125 23548 28425 228 148689 
!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
30!
30!
Chapter!5:!Results!!
!
5.1!Introduction!!
!
Table!3 and Table!4 show results for estimating treaty participation using the 
SOX and NOX pollution transfer coefficients and country level emissions, respectively. I 
present results for pooled OLS, year fixed effects, and country pair fixed effects. The 
preferred specification is presented in column 3 with country pair fixed effects and is 
discussed in section 5.2 of this chapter.  In the country pair fixed effects specification, we 
are able to examine how joint treaty participation for each country pair differs from 
average treaty participation for that unique country pair across the sample time period. 
Because the OLS and year fixed effects models do not control for time-invariant country 
pair characteristics, the coefficients may be biased in these models. As such, the country 
pair fixed effects model is the preferred specification.  
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are for model specifications that include 
total inward FDI into country i. The empirical strategy adopted is consistent with 
literature on environmental treaty participation, where joint treaty participation is 
estimated as a function of cross-border air pollution, FDI, trade, and other country 
characteristics. The results presented in section 5.2 are consistent with findings of 
previous literature, and suggest that cross-border air pollution between two countries does 
increase cooperation between those countries even after controlling for country pair fixed 
effects. In particular, these results suggest that countries that receive more cross-border 
pollution from another country (than they themselves send there) are more likely to 
jointly ratify environmental treaties with that country. Conversely, the results suggest that 
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counties that send more cross-border pollution to another country (than they 
themselves receive) are less likely to enter into environmental treaties with that other 
country. 
Additional model specifications are discussed in section 5.3. Table!5 and Table!6 
show results using bilateral inward FDI flow into country i from country j. Preferred 
specifications are in columns 3 and 4, which compare results using bilateral FDI and total 
inward FDI. Much of the statistical significance found under the preferred model 
specification is lost when bilateral FDI is included instead of total inward FDI. This is 
likely due to the substantial decrease in sample size between the different model 
specifications, which can be attributed to the low number of observations available for 
the bilateral FDI variables.15 
 
Table 3 SOX transfer coefficient and emissions, total inward FDI 
! (1)! (2)! (3)!
VARIABLES OLS Year FE Year &  
Country pair FE 
    
TransferSOxji 0.006 -0.072 0.096* 
 (0.193) (0.192) (0.057) 
Ln(SOxit) 0.013** 0.020*** -0.009*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) 
Distanceij -0.262*** -0.268***  
 (0.009) (0.009)  
Ln(FDIit) 0.045*** 0.026*** -0.006** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
Ln(Exportsit) -0.169*** -0.209*** -0.012* 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) 
Ln(GDP per capitait) 0.639*** 0.729*** -0.013 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 As shown in Tables 3 and 4, there are 10,124 and 10,142 observations for the preferred model 
specification that includes total inward FDI into country i, while there are 3,569 and 3,590 
observations for the model specifications that include the bilateral FDI variables, as shown in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
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 (0.029) (0.041) (0.014) 
Ln(Populationit) 0.188*** 0.224*** 0.018*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.006) 
Freedomit 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Constant -1.416*** -1.454*** 1.494*** 
 (0.133) (0.136) (0.057) 
    
Observations 10,124 10,124 10,124 
R-squared 0.350 0.369 0.954 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 NOX transfer coefficient and emissions, total inward FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS Year FE Year &  
Country pair FE 
    
TransferNOxji -0.078 -0.252 0.131** 
 (0.177) (0.179) (0.054) 
Ln(NOxit) 0.208*** 0.278*** -0.020*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) 
Distanceij -0.266*** -0.269***  
 (0.008) (0.009)  
Ln(FDIit) 0.057*** 0.021** -0.006* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
Ln(Exportsit) -0.177*** -0.132*** -0.013** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.007) 
Ln(GDP per capitait) 0.554*** 0.401*** 0.006 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.015) 
Ln(Populationit) 0.017 -0.068*** 0.029*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.009) 
Freedomit 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant 0.093 0.886*** 1.331*** 
 (0.159) (0.188) (0.076) 
    
Observations 10,142 10,142 10,142 
R-squared 0.360 0.384 0.954 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2!Baseline!Results!
!
Focusing on results in column 3 of Tables 3 and 4 with country pair fixed effects, 
the coefficients explain changes in the log of joint treaty participation over the sample 
period 1980-1999. Based on these results, I find that countries that receive more cross-
border pollution from another country (than they themselves send there) are more likely 
to jointly ratify environmental treaties with that country. In the pooled OLS and year 
fixed effects specifications, FDI has the expected positive effect on treaty participation. 
After controlling for country pair fixed effects, however, increasing FDI decreases joint 
treaty participation. While this is an economically small effect, it is statistically 
significant. Increasing exports has a small negative effect on joint treaty participation, 
though it is double the effect of FDI. This suggests that over the sample period 1980-
1999 countries that opened up to international trade and investments at a more rapid rate 
cooperated less in the environmental arena. This could partly be explained by the fall of 
socialism and creation of new countries in Eastern Europe. These new economies have 
been focused on opening up to trade and investment and may on average be neglecting 
catching up in environmental treaty ratification. 
Below, I discuss the specific effects of each explanatory variable on treaty 
participation. The results for all other independent variables are similar whether SOX or 
NOX transfer coefficients are included in the pooled OLS, year fixed effects, and country 
pair fixed effects models. Focusing on the country pair fixed effects model in column 3, 
there are statistically significant relationships between joint treaty participation and the 
pollution transfer coefficient, country level emissions, FDI, exports, population, and 
political freedom. 
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Pollution Transfer Coefficient 
!
This study’s main variable of interest for determining joint environmental treaty 
participation is the cross-border air pollution transfer coefficient. For the country pair 
fixed effects model, I find that an increase in cross-border air pollution increases joint 
treaty participation between countries. Over the sample period 1980-1999 countries that 
receive more cross-border pollution from another country (than they themselves send 
there) jointly ratify more environmental treaties with that country. When cross-border 
pollution of SOX into country i from country j increases by 3.3 percent of country j’s 
emissions (the standard deviation), joint treaty participation by country i with country j 
increases by 0.32 percent (0.033*9.6%). A similar effect is found for the NOX transfer 
coefficient. When cross-border NOX pollution into country i from country j increases by 
one standard deviation of country j’s emissions (3.7 percent), joint treaty participation by 
country i with country j increases by .48 percent (0.037*13.1%). These results are 
consistent with the theory of emissions tax competition described by Davies and 
Naughton (2014) in Chapter 3, and support the hypothesis that countries that receive 
more cross-border pollution from another country (than they themselves send there) are 
more likely to ratify environmental treaties with that country. 
 
Distance 
!
Distanceij is not included in the country pair fixed effects model, as it is 
symmetric and constant for country pairs across time. However, it is important to note 
that the results of the pooled OLS and year fixed effects models support the hypothesis 
that distance between countries is negatively associated with treaty participation. As 
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distance between i-j country pairs increased by 1000 kilometers, joint treaty 
participation between these countries decreases by 26.6 percent and 29.6 percent for 
pooled OLS and year fixed effects models, respectively. In these model specifications, 
perhaps Distanceij also captures cross-border pollution effects since the transfer 
coefficients are statistically insignificant for both the SOX and NOX regressions. 
 
Country Level Emissions 
!
 Similar results are found regarding the effect of country level emissions on joint 
treaty participation when either SOX or NOX variables are included. This is true for each 
model specifications in Tables 3 and 4. For the country pair fixed effects specification, an 
increase in country i’s SOX emissions led to a small decreases in joint treaty participation 
for the i-j country pair. As SOX emissions increased by 1 percent, participation decreases 
by .009 percent on average, holding all else constant. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in 
NOX emissions led to a .02 percent decrease in treaty participation. In the pooled OLS 
and year fixed effects model, increasing country i’s SOX emissions increased joint treaty 
participation by .013 and .020 percent, respectively. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in 
NOX emissions increases participation by .208 percent and .278 percent in the pooled 
OLS and year fixed effects models. Although this effect is economically small, this 
finding matches that of Egger et al. (2011), who found that countries with higher 
emissions participate in fewer environmental treaties.  
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International Commerce: FDI and Trade 
!
Results concerning the relationship between international commerce and 
environmental cooperation provide mixed support for theories and previous empirical 
findings about treaty participation. The results of the pooled OLS and year fixed effects 
models show that FDI is positively associated with joint treaty participation. In pooled 
OLS, increasing FDI by 1 percent increases joint treaty participation by .045 and .057 
percent for SOX and NOX regressions, respectively. With year fixed effects, a 1 percent 
increase in FDI increased joint treaty participation by .026 and .021 percent when SOX 
and NOX variables are used. Although these effects are economically small, these 
findings suggest that FDI can foster environmental cooperation between countries. These 
results match those of Rose and Spiegel (2009) who found that country pairs raise 
bilateral capital flows (i.e. investment) when participating in a bilateral environmental 
agreement. These results are also similar to those of Egger et al. (2011) who found that 
wealthier countries with a stronger leaning toward investment liberalization are more 
likely than other countries to participate in IEAs. Likewise, Davies and Naughton (2014) 
found that FDI has either a positive effect on treaty participation or is insignificant, which 
partially supports the results of the pooled OLS and year fixed effects models in this 
study. However, the results of the country pair fixed effects model paint a different 
picture. In this model, an increase in total inward FDI into country i led to a small but 
statistically significant decrease in joint treaty participation by the i-j country pair. When 
FDI increased by one percent, joint treaty participation decreases by .006 percent on 
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average across the sample time period.16 This effect is the same when either SOX or 
NOX variables are included in the model, and is a departure from the findings of previous 
empirical work mentioned above.   
For all model specifications shown in Tables 3 and 4, exports are negatively 
associated with joint treaty participation. These results differ from the findings of Davies 
and Naughton (2014), Egger et al. (2011), and Rose and Spiegel (2009) who all found 
that increasing trade leads to higher environmental treaty participation. When the SOX 
variables are included in the country pair fixed effects model, a 1 percent increase in 
country i’s exports decreases treaty participation by .012 percent for the i-j country pair. 
When NOX variables are included, joint treaty participation decreases by .013 percent on 
average when exports rose by 1 percent. These results are at odds with much of the 
theoretical and empirical literature regarding the relationship between trade and 
environmental treaty participation, which suggest that countries that interact via 
economic exchange are influenced to cooperate in other ways, including in the 
environmental realm.  
 
Additional Explanatory Variables: GDP per capita, population, political freedom 
!
Although GDP per capita is not statistically significant in the country pair fixed 
effects model, the results of the pooled OLS and year fixed effects specifications match 
the expectation that increasing GDP per capita will increase joint treaty participation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The unexpected negative sign on total inward FDI flow may be caused by pooling rich and poor 
countries in the dataset. Although the empirical model controls for per capita GDP, which is one indicator 
of a country’s wealth, future research should consider additional variables to account for wealth and 
income of countries in the dataset. 
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Increasing population also led to higher treaty participation in the country pair fixed 
effects model, though this effect is economically small. A 1 percent increase in 
population increases joint treaty participation by .018 percent when SOX variables are 
used, and increases participation by .029 percent when NOX variables are included. 
Together, GDP and population control for the size of a country’s economy and per capita 
income. These results match previous findings that large economies are more likely to 
participate in international treaties. Similarly, increasing a country’s level of political 
freedom also increases joint treaty participation by country pairs for each model 
specification shown in Tables 3 and 4. When either the SOX or NOX variables are 
included in the country pair fixed effects model, a 1 point improvement in the total 
political freedom index led to a 1.4 percent increase in joint treaty participation for the i-j 
country pair, holding all else constant. This small but statistically significant effect 
supports the idea that if citizens prefer strong environmental standards, political freedom 
should increase environmental treaty participation by countries.   
 
5.3!Additional!Results!
!
 This section presents results for additional model specifications that use alterative 
measures of FDI. The preferred specifications are found in columns 3 and 4, which show 
results using bilateral inward FDI into country i from country j and total inward FDI flow 
into country i, respectively. These results illustrate that many of the statistically 
significant variables found in previous model specifications are lost when bilateral FDI is 
included instead of total inward FDI. The drop in statistical significance may be due to 
the large decrease in sample size when bilateral FDI variables are used in place of total 
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FDI inflow. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, there are 10,124 and 10,142 observations for 
the preferred model specification that includes total inward FDI into country i, while 
there are 3,569 and 3,590 observations for the model specifications that include the 
bilateral FDI variables.
!
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Table 5 SOX variables, bilateral inward FDI versus total inward FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Year FE Year &  
Country pair FE 
Year &  
Country pair FE 
     
TransferSOxji 1.148*** 1.133*** -0.031 -0.005 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.087) (0.088) 
Ln(SOxit) -0.063*** -0.053*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
Distanceij -0.156*** -0.159***   
 (0.019) (0.019)   
Ln(inward FDIjit) 0.218 0.210 -0.015  
 (0.151) (0.146) (0.012)  
Ln(FDIit)    0.009*** 
    (0.003) 
Ln(Exportsit) -0.247*** -0.232*** 0.008 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(GDP per capitait) 0.680*** 0.639*** -0.039* -0.044** 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ln(Populationit) 0.252*** 0.230*** 0.008 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.009) (0.009) 
Freedomit 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.004* 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant -1.091 -0.844 1.880*** 1.739*** 
 (1.253) (1.222) (0.143) (0.096) 
     
Observations 3,569 3,569 3,569 3,569 
R-squared 0.195 0.205 0.953 0.953 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1!
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Table 6 NOX variables, bilateral inward FDI versus total inward FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS Year FE Year &  
Country pair FE 
Year &  
Country pair FE 
     
TransferNOxji 1.483*** 1.460*** 0.073 0.100 
 (0.278) (0.280) (0.087) (0.087) 
Ln(NOxit) -0.019 0.057** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.008) (0.008) 
Distanceij -0.150*** -0.151***   
 (0.019) (0.019)   
Ln(inward FDIjit) 0.216 0.206 -0.014  
 (0.150) (0.144) (0.011)  
Ln(FDIit)    0.010*** 
    (0.003) 
Ln(Exportsit) -0.203*** -0.149*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(GDP per capitait) 0.692*** 0.520*** 0.025 0.022 
 (0.046) (0.070) (0.022) (0.022) 
Ln(Populationit) 0.168*** 0.058 0.051*** 0.046*** 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.012) (0.012) 
Freedomit 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.005* 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant -1.616 -0.696 1.394*** 1.272*** 
 (1.245) (1.229) (0.153) (0.113) 
     
Observations 3,590 3,590 3,590 3,590 
R-squared 0.191 0.204 0.953 0.954 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1!
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Chapter!6:!Conclusion!
!
6.1!Discussion!
!
Globalization and international commerce can have important implications for 
the environment and climate change at large, which countries seek to address, in part, 
through international environmental agreements. This paper has discussed some of the 
broader reasoning for countries to participate in IEAs from an environmental 
perspective, as well as economic literature on IEA effectiveness and participation. While 
there are strong environmental arguments in favor of IEAs, the theoretical and empirical 
literature suggest that IEAs are largely ineffective at reducing countries’ emissions 
below business-as-usual levels. This raises questions about the incentives for countries 
to participate in IEAs. The economic literature offers theoretical and empirical evidence 
regarding the roles of international commerce—specifically trade and FDI—and cross-
border air pollution in influencing IEA participation.  
The empirical work presented in this paper provides partial support for economic 
theories and empirical work on IEA participation. On the one hand, this study has found 
evidence that cross-border air pollution between country pairs affects those countries’ 
joint participation in IEAs after controlling for country pair fixed effects, or that distance 
captures these effects in the pooled OLS and year fixed effects regressions. Specifically, 
the results of the country pair fixed effects model specification suggest that countries 
that receive more cross-border pollution from another country (than they themselves 
send there) are more likely to jointly ratify environmental treaties with that country. 
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Overall, these results support the finding of Davies and Naughton (2014) that 
proximate countries are more likely to jointly participate in environmental treaties. On 
the other hand, little evidence was found to support the idea that increasing international 
commerce—specifically FDI and trade—leads to higher joint environmental treaty 
participation between countries. In fact, this study found that increasing trade and 
investments led to less treaty participation, although these effects were economically 
small.  
There are various possible explanations for this. First, the lack of convincing 
evidence that international commerce improves environmental cooperation raises 
questions about greenwashing and treaty effectiveness; that is, is participation by 
countries in environmental treaties more about image or substance? Do countries enter 
into environmental agreements in order to be perceived as environmentally friendly—
without actually meeting the specific terms of the treaties—or are legitimate strides 
being made to achieve treaty goals? If treaties aren’t effective, what is the point of 
participating? Is it to receive the benefits of trade and investment that may come with the 
perception of being an environmentally friendly nation? As discussed in the literature 
review, research by Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Egger et al. (2011) suggests that 
membership in IEAs has surged because joining an IEA acts as a signaling effect for 
other forms of cooperation, particularly with respect to economic exchange, implying 
that countries are more willing to voluntarily submit to environmental regulations if 
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participation will influence other outcomes such as membership in trade, investment, 
or political agreements.17 
Second, it is important to note that the trade and investment landscape has 
changed significantly since 1999, the last year analyzed by this study. The expansion of 
the European Union and other trade blocs following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
as well as unprecedented growth of FDI across the globe, have significantly altered the 
nature of international trade and investment. For example, FDI flows grew from $82 
billion in 1982 to $2.3 trillion in 2007 prior to the global financial crisis. In 2008 global 
FDI flows were approximately $1.8 trillion (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). Additionally, 
European and international environmental treaty participation, as well as membership in 
trade agreements, have greatly expanded since 1999. Given these changes, there are 
substantial opportunities for further research regarding the relationship between 
international commerce and the environment.  
 
6.2!Future!Research!
!
Future research in this area would benefit greatly from more recent data on FDI, 
trade, and cross-border pollution. Additionally, the bilateral FDI data used for the 
empirical analyses in this study greatly limited the sample size, so the inclusion of 
bilateral data with more observations would be a significant improvement. Using 
bilateral FDI data would give researchers a better idea of the nature of cooperation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 This raises questions about endogeneity regarding the relationship between trade, investment, 
and treaty participation. That is, does the signaling effect work both ways? Can trade and 
investment policies influence treaty participation, or do participation in treaties affect trade and 
investment outcomes? More consideration should be given to this issue in future research. 
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between countries with respect to both international commerce and environmental 
treaties. It would also be interesting to examine treaty participation worldwide as a 
function of trade and FDI instead of limiting the study region to Europe. However, the 
focus of this study was to examine the effect of cross-border air pollution on treaty 
participation, and pollution transfer coefficient data were only available for the 35 
European countries used in this study.   
Although further research is needed to improve our understanding of the 
incentives for countries to participate in IEAs, this study’s broad goal has been to 
provide insights regarding the motivations for IEA participation, specifically with 
respect to cross-border air pollution and international commerce. This was done through 
a review of prior theoretical and empirical work as well as additional empirical analyses 
from which future empirical work on IEA participation can build. In the next chapter, I 
offer additional comments on the relationship between international commerce and the 
environment within the context of globalization and climate change, as well as make 
suggestions for what could be done—beyond participation in environmental 
agreements—to address climate change and other social, economic, and environmental 
issues in this context. 
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Chapter!7:!Afterword:!!
Globalization,!Justice,!and!the!Environment!
 
This section explores the relationship between globalization and the environment, with 
specific attention given to the roles of international commerce and neoliberal economic 
globalization in shaping issues of social, economic, and environmental justice. 
 
7.1!The!Opportunity!of!Globalization!!
!
Most things we do in everyday life are affected by globalization. The food we 
eat, the clothes we wear, and the computer I’m writing this on. The fact that we 
experience globalization every day, for better or worse, warrants our intense 
examination of this phenomenon. Globalization improves and harms the lives of many, 
often simultaneously, and there is much debate about its social, economic, and 
environmental implications. In their book Paths to a Green World, authors Jennifer 
Clapp and Peter Dauvergne (2011, 20) define globalization as:    
a multidimensional process, broadly restructuring and integrating the world’s 
economies, institutions, and civil societies. It is a dynamic, ongoing, and 
accelerating process that is increasing the links among actors, as well as the 
structures within which they operate, both within states and across borders. 
 
Globalization itself has many meanings to many people, and there is much more to it 
than a single definition. Different definitions and perspectives on globalization exist 
because people experience the world in vastly different ways. For example, middle class 
Americans are largely isolated from those who may experience globalization in a 
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negative light. As such, there is often disagreement about what globalization is, who 
it benefits, and who it might harm. This makes addressing issues of social, economic, 
and environmental justice a complicated endeavor. That said, I’d like to propose a way 
of thinking about globalization to keep in mind as we move forward. 
Globalization is an opportunity. It is an opportunity to improve access to health 
care around the world, spread democracy, and advocate for universal human rights. It is 
an opportunity to travel, learn new languages, and meet new people. It is an opportunity 
to improve social and economic livelihoods while striving for environmental 
sustainability. But globalization is also an opportunity to fail to do so. What, if any, are 
the consequences if we continue down the current path of globalization?  
In In Search of the Good Life, author Rebecca Todd Peters (2004) develops a 
moral lens through which we can analyze globalization’s current trajectory. Her work 
breaks through much of the noise surrounding globalization to make a clear, simple, and 
profound argument that humanity has a moral obligation—and perhaps more 
importantly moral agency or capacity—to change the nature of globalization and the 
ways in which it unfolds.18 Peters argues that humans are fundamentally moral creatures, 
and that globalization must be grounded in values that prioritize a democratized 
understanding of power, encourage care for the planet, and enhance the social well being 
of people.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Rebecca Todd Peters (2004) argues that: “moral agency is at the heart of ethical practice. 
Inherent in human nature is the capacity to make rational decisions about our behavior and 
actions in accordance with particular norms about what is right and wrong” (Todd Peters 2004: 
23). She views moral agency as humanity’s capacity to make such decisions and take action on 
issues of social, economic, and environmental justice. 
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7.2!Globalization,!International!Commerce,!and!the!Environment!
!
Peters characterizes neoliberalism as the dominant model of globalization 
unfolding in our world today. She argues that neoliberal globalization concentrates 
power among transnational corporations, corporate business leaders, and institutions 
such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Grounded in neoclassical economics, neoliberalism stresses the role of individuals and 
private enterprise as drivers of economic growth. As neoliberal economic policies 
gained sway, particularly in the United States and England during the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations, the increasing influence of transnational corporations 
corresponded with a decrease in the role of government. Neoliberal globalization is 
characterized by an integrated global economy centered around export-oriented trade, 
which neoliberals argue is best facilitated though low-barrier markets (i.e. deregulation) 
and a highly competitive private sector.19  
Transnational corporations are driven by sales and profit. To consistently achieve 
higher sales and profits requires economic growth, which neoliberals argue is the 
bedrock of a healthy global economy. They argue that national economies, both rich and 
poor, benefit from a strong (and growing) global economy, which in turn leads citizens 
to demand cleaner environments. When TNCs and national economies are successful, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The neoliberal model of globalization promotes competition in international commerce—
specifically regarding trade and FDI (i.e. capital mobility)—which can have implications for the 
environment as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this paper. 
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more funds are available to invest in cleaner technologies and better environmental 
management. As people get richer they desire cleaner environments, which they have 
the ability to achieve through their newfound wealth. This is the premise of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, which has been used to justify 
economic growth often at the expense of the environment. The EKC hypothesis predicts 
that environmental damage will increase until a given level of per capita income, or 
‘development,’ and then begins to fall as income continues to rise, as shown in Figure 2 
below (Kuznets, 1955). 
 Figure 2 Environmental Kuznets Curve 
!
 
Empirical evidence of the EKC is mixed, with some studies showing the EKC 
only holds for certain pollutants or in already developed countries such as those in the 
OECD (see Harbaugh et al. 2002; Stern 2004; Stern and Common 2001). Moreover, 
economists Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) found that trade and economic 
growth can help or harm the environment depending on specific country conditions that 
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relate to the scale and composition of economic activity, as well as technologies used 
in that economy. For example, a country with lax environmental standards and a 
comparative advantage in a dirty industry will likely grow its economy through trade, 
which may come at the expense of its environment. Despite this, proponents of 
neoliberalism continue to argue that economic growth will ultimately create a cleaner 
environment. They argue that the neoliberal model of globalization actually promotes 
environmental stewardship and offers a path to economic success for developing 
countries. 
The neoliberal perspective views transnational corporations as “engines of 
sustainable development” and key players in efforts to raise social, economic, and 
environmental standards (Clapp and Dauvergne, 161). Neoliberals argue that 
government intervention through the enforcement of IEAs, for example, creates 
inefficient markets that hinder market forces from solving environmental problems (e.g. 
developing cleaner energy technologies that pollute less). Although neoliberals 
acknowledge that TNCs and FDI can harm the environment, they assert that market 
mechanisms are the most efficient and effective way to achieve better environmental 
management practices in the end. They advocate for voluntary self-regulation with 
respect to their environmental practices—a viewpoint that is drawn into question by 
much of the theoretical and empirical literature on environmental treaty effectiveness.20 
Critics of the neoliberal model of globalization argue that markets alone are not 
enough to address environmental problems, and therefore governments should create 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For theoretical and empirical literature on environmental treaty effectiveness, see Barrett 
1994a, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Egger et al. 2011; Finus and Maus 2008; and 
Kellenberg and Levinson 2013. 
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regulatory framework in which markets and firms operate. Most governments strive 
to integrate themselves into the global economy by introducing policies to attract trade 
and FDI. Generally, the underlying goal is to foster macroeconomic growth in their 
economy, which may come at the expense of the environment. Governments seek to 
reconcile economic growth with environmental concerns by setting environmental 
standards for corporations. One example is the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which is an example of an IEA in which the European Union capped emissions 
levels and created a marketplace for Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), or carbon 
credits. These credits represent the purchaser’s right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide or 
other greenhouse gas with a one ton CO2 equivalent, which can then be traded on the 
free market. The goal of such policies is to create an attractive investment climate that 
offers corporations proper incentives to simultaneously protect the environment and 
promote sustainable economic development.21  
Richard Peet’s Unholy Trinity provides historical and contemporary analysis of 
what he refers to as the ‘global governance institutions’—the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. These institutions have played 
significant roles in shaping the nature of globalization from the end of World War II 
onward and continue to be key players on the global scene. The IMF seeks to facilitate 
international trade and financial security among its 188 member nations. The World 
Bank funds numerous development projects around the world and runs the BioCarbon 
Fund, which finances projects that sequester or conserve carbon in forests and agro-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Newell and Paterson (2010) for further discussion of carbon markets and climate change. 
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ecosystems across the globe. Although there has been much criticism of the World 
Bank’s role in such projects (and criticism of carbon markets in general), the World 
Bank still has an important role to play in improving social, economic, and 
environmental outcomes. Similarly, the WTO plays a crucial role in regulating trade and 
navigating the complicated relationship that exists between trade, economic growth, and 
the environment. Given that the WTO consistently favors trade and economic growth 
over environmental concerns, many have advocated for the creation of a World 
Environmental Organization to counterbalance the WTO. 
Critics of the neoliberal model of globalization also argue that the long history of 
labor and environmental transgressions by transnational corporations should leave us 
highly skeptical of corporate motives, particularly regarding rhetoric on sustainability 
and sustainable development. They see this as greenwashing, which is more about the 
perception of ‘going green’ than legitimate consideration for the environment (Newell 
and Paterson 2010). This is evidenced by double standards of TNCs with respect to 
industrial flight and pollution havens, as well as continued labor and environmental 
abuses in industries such as mining, logging, oil extraction, and electronics (see Clapp 
and Dauvergne, 172).  
 In Globalization and The Environment: Capitalism, Ecology, & Power, Peter 
Newell makes an intriguing point that “unsustainable development is profitable” 
(Newell, 112). This idea is propagated by the neoliberal model of globalization, which 
arguably favors profit over equitable economic development, social justice, and 
environmental sustainability. Although many TNCs are making strides to improve labor 
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and environmental practices, Newell argues that corporate irresponsibility continues 
to be the norm in many parts of the world. This necessitates a more prominent role for 
government and civil society to guide the future path of globalization. Perhaps 
enforceable international environmental agreements can be a part of this process. 
However, IEAs and other forms of government intervention do not go far enough 
to address environmental concerns. Neoliberals make a persuasive argument that 
governments can create inefficiencies and hinder market activity, which can ultimately 
lead to more environmental harm than good. Yet their argument that market forces alone 
will solve environmental problems does not hold water. Greenwashing by corporations 
is all too common and often overshadows legitimate efforts to address environmental 
concerns. Greenwashing can be combated in part by watchdog efforts by governments, 
NGOs, and social movements. In Making Globalization Work, former chief economist at 
the World Bank and Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2006) argues that 
the unprecedented levels of economic growth and wealth created by neoliberal 
globalization should be utilized to make the case for social, economic, and 
environmental justice. Moreover, he argues that democratic governments have learned to 
“temper the excesses of capitalism: to channel the power of the market, to ensure that 
there are more winners and fewer losers” (Stiglitz, 2006, 276). While this approach has 
worked relatively well in the Global North, we have largely failed to democratize power 
in the rest of the world. This has resulted in great economic inequality, environmental 
harm, and the disempowerment of many people in the Global South—particularly 
indigenous groups, women, and the poor. Actions in the Global North often 
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disproportionately affect these groups, whether by way of larger and more frequent 
environmental disasters such as tropical storms, floods, or droughts, or through the 
creation of pollution havens (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). 
 
7.3!Globalization!and!Climate!Change:!What’s!Next?!
!
So, what should be done in response to economic globalization and climate 
change? Recall that globalization is an opportunity. It is an opportunity to build a world 
around principles of social, economic, and environmental justice as well as an 
opportunity to fail at this. First, we must work to empower those who are marginalized 
by the dominant neoliberal model of globalization. This can be achieved in part by 
democratizing power. The empirical findings of this study support the theory that 
countries with stronger political and civil institutions participate in more environmental 
treaties. As such, democratizing power is an important step to addressing environmental 
problems, which are often closely related to social and economic issues. Recognizing 
that humans have a moral obligation and capacity to change how globalization affects 
such groups is key to democratizing power. While democratizing power in the Global 
South must be a priority, we must also strengthen our democracies in the Global 
North. By democratizing power we give voice to those who are most vulnerable to the 
forces of climate change and economic globalization, be they in the Global North or 
South. 
Second, we must rethink our concept of economic growth as good for 
development. Joshua Farley and Herman Daly are prominent ecological economists who 
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advocate for ‘degrowth,’ which views GDP as a measure of costs instead of benefits 
(Farley and Daly 2004). Bill McKibben, the founder of 350.org, makes a similar case in 
his book Deep Economy: the Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future, as do 
authors Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson in Climate Capitalism: Global Warming 
and the Transformation of the Global Economy (McKibben 2007; Newell and Paterson 
2010). Newell and Paterson (2010) argue that until we recognize that there are 
ecological limits to growth, climate capitalism will become just another form of 
greenwashing. Farley, Daly, and McKibben argue that degrowth may cause hardship, 
but it is necessary to create an ecologically sustainable form of globalization.22   
Finally, we must take a hard look at consumption habits and what we truly mean 
by sustainability. Capitalism often overlooks the social and environmental components 
of sustainability in favor of economic growth. To actually practice sustainability, we 
must address complacency and apathy in our everyday lives with respect to consumption 
habits.23 For example, fossil fuel dependence drives anthropogenic climate change, and 
therefore it is imperative that we pursue sustainable and economically viable alternative 
energy sources. Demand for alternative energy increases as the economic and 
environmental costs of fossil fuel rise. With this, we see focused efforts to increase 
efficiency for all types of energy, as well as a shift toward clean and renewable energy 
sources such as hydropower, geothermal, wind, solar, and combustible renewables such 
as biofuels (Ladanai & Vinterback, 2009). These three things—empowering 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Farley, Daly, and McKibben also argue that we can experience an intense sense of fulfillment and well 
being by working cooperatively to overcome such hardships. 
23 For example, should I drive to work or walk half a block to the bus stop? Should I keep my house at a 
balmy 70 degrees in the middle of winter? These are only two examples, but meaningful actions to 
mitigate climate change and economic globalization must address such everyday consumption habits.  
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marginalized voices, rethinking economic growth, and reevaluating our mindset 
regarding sustainability and consumption, particularly with respect to energy use—must 
happen if we are to alter the path of globalization to reflect values of social, economic, 
and environmental justice.  
Climate change and globalization are unique phenomena, and failing to act on 
them will result in consequences yet to be seen. This makes our challenges and 
opportunities to address them unique. Changing climates can have negative effects on 
various people across the globe, many of whom are marginalized within the current 
global economic system. Thus it becomes a question of justice and morality regarding 
the path of globalization we choose to take. Should this path be guided by moral values 
that prioritize a democratized understanding of power, encourage care for the planet, and 
enhance the social well being of people? I mentioned earlier that globalization provides 
an opportunity to travel, learn new languages, and meet new people. Combining my own 
experiences abroad with my academic experiences has helped me put a human face on 
globalization. If we can humanize globalization, it becomes easier to make a moral, 
economic, and ecological case for addressing issues of social, economic, and 
environmental justice, which I think are closely related to climate change. In doing so 
we can improve social and economic livelihoods while striving for environmental 
sustainability. To me this is the ultimate goal of globalization, and we must strive to 
bring together governments, the private sector, and civil society to engage in 
constructive actions to realize this opportunity. 
!
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APPENDIX!A!
!
Table A1 lists international environmental agreements that have been evaluated by 
empirical studies. Tables A2 and A3 outline empirical studies that employ multiple 
regression and trend analyses, respectively. !
 
Table A1 International Environmental Agreements Evaluated by Empirical Studies 
Agreement Limits Studiesii 
1985 Helsinki Protocol Sulfur emissions 7 
1988 Sofia Protocol NOX emissions 4 
1994 Oslo Protocol Sulfur emissions 2 
1995 Ban Amendment to the 1992 Basel 
Convention 
Prohibits hazardous waste movement 
to non-party, non-OECD countries. 
1 
1972 Oslo Convention Marine pollution dumping by ships and 
aircraft 
1 
1988 Polar Bear Management Agreement 
for the Southern Beaufort Sea 
Different parameters of polar bear 
hunting 
1 
1998 Naryn/Syr Darya Basin Agreement Water releases at Toktogul reservoir 1 
1999 Gothenberg Protocol Sulfur, NOx, VOCs and ammonia 
emissions 
1 
 
1999 North Sea as a MARPOLi Special 
Area and 2000 EU directive on Port 
Reception Facilities 
Pollution by ships 1 
 
Source: Houghton and Naughton (2014) 
Notes: 
i MARPOL – International convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. 
ii Some studies evaluate more than one IEA.  
!
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Table A2 IEA Effectiveness Studies Employing Multiple Regression Analysis 
Author (year) Agreement(s) 
Empirical 
approach 
Environmental 
variable Y  Sample Findings 
Murdoch et al. 
(1997) 
 
 
1985 Helsinki,  
1988 Sofia 
Protocol 
Spatial lag model 
(ML) 
Voluntary 
reductions in SO2 
and NOX emissions 
25 European 
countries,  
one time period 
1980 to 1990 
Helsinki protocol helped lower 
SO2 emissions but the Sofia 
protocol did not affect NOX 
emissions.  
Murdoch et al. 
(2003) 
 
 
1985 Helsinki 
Protocol 
Joint spatial 
probit and spatial 
lag equations 
(FIML) 
SO2 emissions 
reduction 
25 European 
countries,  
one time period 
1980 to 1990 
Voluntary cutbacks beyond the 
target motivate free riding. 
Maddison 
(2006) 
 
 
1985 Helsinki, 
1988 Sofia 
Protocol 
OLS & Spatial 
mixed model 
(ML) 
Change in log of 
per capita SO2 and 
NOX emissions 
135 countries, 
one time period 
1990 to 1995 
Helsinki and Sofia Protocols 
decreased per capita emissions for 
treaty signatories. 
Naughton 
(2010) 
 
 
1985 Helsinki, 
1994 Oslo, 
1988 Sofia 
Protocols 
Spatial lag using 
2SLS, year and 
country fixed 
effects 
Log of per capita 
SO2 and NOX 
emissions 
16 European 
countries, 
1980-2000 
No effect of Helsinki or Oslo 
Protocols on SO2 emissions, but 
Sofia protocol reduced NOX 
emissions level and trend on 
average. 
Bratberg et al. 
(2005) 
 
1988 Sofia 
Protocol 
Difference-in-
difference  
First differences of 
log of NOX 
emissions 
23 European 
countries,  
1980-1996 
Sofia Protocol increased annual 
emission reductions by 2.1%. 
!
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Author (year) Agreement(s) 
Empirical 
approach 
Environmental 
variable Y  Sample Findings 
Aakvik & 
Tjøtta (2010) 
 
1985 Helsinki, 
1994 Oslo 
Protocols 
Difference-in-
difference  
First differences 
(annual changes) 
in log of sulfur 
emissions 
30 European 
countries,  
1960-2002 
Neither protocol had a statistically 
significant effect on emissions 
once country-specific trends 
(linear or quadratic are included). 
Ringquist & 
Kostadinova 
(2005) 
 
 
1985 Helsinki 
Protocol 
OLS, fixed 
effects, random 
trend 
 
Percentage change 
in SO2 emissions 
since 1980 
19 European 
countries, 
1980-1994 
Helsinki protocol has made no 
difference in nations success at 
reducing SO2 emissions. 
Table A2 continued. IEA Effectiveness Studies Employing Multiple Regression Analysis 
Source: Houghton and Naughton (2014) 
!
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Table A3 IEA Effectiveness Studies Employing Trend Analyses 
Author (Year) Agreement  Sample 
Environmental 
variable Y Findings 
Skjaerseth (1992) 1972 Oslo Convention Aggregated change in 
waste, some interval 
between 1976 & 1986 
Waste dumped and 
waste incinerated at 
sea 
Not perfect convention goal 
achievement but fairly successful. 
Brower et al. (2002) 1988 Polar Bear 
Management Agreement 
for the Southern Beaufort 
Sea 
Canadian and 
Alaskan portions of 
the southern Beaufort 
Sea,  
1980-1998 
Yearly polar bear 
harvest by sex and age 
group 
Successful agreement—sustainable 
limits of total harvest and the 
harvest of females. 
Bernauer & Siegfried 
(2008) 
1998 Naryn/Syr Darya 
Basin Agreement 
Toktogul reservoir 
(shared by 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan & 
Uzbekistan),  
1980-2006 
Monthly water release 
from Toktogul 
reservoir relative to 
1998 targets 
Higher compliance for some seasons 
than for others. 
Kelly et al. (2010) 1999 Gothenberg Protocol 6 European countries,  
1990-2010 
Setting national 
emissions ceilings for 
NOX, SO2, VOC, NH3  
Major downward shifts in emissions 
forecasts were projected to lead to 
these six countries meeting the 
majority of the Protocol targets. 
Largring et al. (2012) 1999 North Sea as a 
MARPOL Special Area 
and 2000 EU directive on 
Port Reception Facilities 
 
North Sea for three 
periods:  
1992-1998,  
2000-2003,  
2007-2010 
Total number of oil 
slicks, total polluted 
surface & total 
polluted volume 
Evidence that each of these IEAs 
improved water pollution in the 
North Sea. 
Source: Houghton and Naughton (2014)
!
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APPENDIX!B!
!
Table B1 summarizes the types of environmental treaties used for the empirical analyses in this 
study, and includes average participation by individual countries. Table B2 details the 110 
treaties including scope, type, and membership level for 1980, 1990, and 1999. 
 
Table B1 Types of treaties with average participation in 1980, 1990 and 1999 
Type of Treaty Number of 
Treaties 
Average 
Participation 
in 1980 
Average 
Participation 
in 1990 
Average 
Participation 
in 1999 
Marine 27 7.8 12.4 16.6 
Nature 24 6.7 12.5 18.5 
Fish 17 2.8 4.4 7.1 
Nuclear 12 7.8 13.9 24.3 
Air 11 0 3.9 28.7 
Hazardous 
Materials 7 0 0 6.7 
Freshwater 6 0.7 2.2 4.2 
Military 3 22.7 31.7 56.3 
Lead 1 32 35 41 
Energy 1 4 5 8 
Transboundary 1 0 0 22 
     Total 110    
     Regional 66 3.2 5.5 8.7 
Global 34 7.1 13.4 30.5 
Global-Marine 10 17 24.9 31.8 
     Total 110    
!
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Table B2 Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!! !! !! Treaty! !! Ratifying!Countries!
Num! Scope! Type! Year! Treaty! 1980! 1990! 1999!
1" Regional" Nature" 1985" ASEAN"Agreement"On"The"Conservation"Of"Nature"And"Natural"Resources" 0" 3" 3"
2" Regional" Nature" 1968" African"Convention"On"The"Conservation"Of"Nature"And"Natural"Resources" 18" 20" 21"
3" Regional" Nuclear" 1996" African"Nuclear"Weapon"Free"Zone"Treaty" 0" 0" 11"
4" Regional" Marine" 1969" Agreement"For"Cooperation"In"Dealing"With"Pollution"Of"The"North"Sea"By"Oil" 6" 6" 6"
5" Regional" Fish" 1949" Agreement"For"The"Establishment"Of"A"General"Fisheries"Commission"For"The"Mediterranean" 11" 13" 17"
6" Global" Energy" 1974" Agreement"On"An"International"Energy"Programme" 4" 5" 8"
7" Regional" Nature" 1973" Agreement"On"Conservation"Of"Polar"Bears" 4" 4" 5"
8" Regional" Nature" 1991" Agreement"On"The"Conservation"Of"Bats"In"Europe" 0" 0" 8"
9" Regional" Nature" 1990" Agreement"On"The"Conservation"Of"Seals"In"The"Wadden"Sea" 0" 0" 3"
10" Regional" Fish" 1929" Agreement"Regarding"The"Regulation"Of"Plaice"(Pleuronectes"Platessa)"And"Flounder"
(Pleuronectes"Flesus)"Fishing"In"The"Baltic"Sea"
3" 4" 4"
11" Regional" Marine" 1954" Agreement"Relating"To"The"Issue"Of"Permits"For"The"Exploitation"Of"The"Maritime"Resources"Of"
The"South"Pacific"
3" 3" 3"
12" Global" Hazardous"
Materials"
1995" Amendment"To"The"Convention"On"The"Control"Of"Transboundary"Movements"Of"Hazardous"
Wastes"And"Their"Disposal"
0" 0" 12"
13" Global" Air" 1990" Amendment"To"The"Montreal"Protocol"On"Substances"That"Deplete"The"Ozone"Layer" 0" 2" 100"
14" Global" Air" 1992" Amendment"To"The"Montreal"Protocol"On"Substances"That"Deplete"The"Ozone"Layer" 0" 0" 78"
15" Global" Air" 1997" Amendment"To"The"Montreal"Protocol"On"Substances"That"Deplete"The"Ozone"Layer" 0" 0" 28"
16" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1978" Amendments"To"Annexes"To"The"Convention"On"The"Prevention"Of"Marine"Pollution"By"Dumping"
Of"Wastes"And"Other"Matter"Concerning"Incineration"At"Sea"
31" 45" 52"
17" Regional" Fish" 1976" Amendments"To"The"Agreement"For"The"Establishment"Of"A"General"Fisheries"Commission"For"
The"Mediterranean"
10" 12" 14"
18" Regional" Marine" 1980" Amendments"To"The"Convention"On"The"Protection"Of"The"Marine"Environment"Of"The"Baltic"Sea"
Area"(Paragraph"B"Of"Regulation"4"In"Annex"IV)"
4" 4" 4"
19" Regional" Marine" 1995" Amendments"To"The"Protocol"For"The"Prevention"And"Elimination"Of"Pollution"Of"The"
Mediterranean"Sea"By"Dumping"From"Ships"And"Aircraft"
0" 0" 5"
20" Regional" Nature" 1953" Constitution"Of"The"European"Commission"For"The"Control"Of"Foot"And"Mouth"Disease" 15" 16" 17"
21" Regional" Marine" 1937" Convention"Between"Denmark,"Norway"And"Sweden"Concerning"The"Preservation"Of"Plaice"And"
Dab"In"The"Skagerrak,"Kattegat"And"Sound"
3" 3" 3"
22" Regional" Fish" 1958" Convention"Concerning"Fishing"In"The"Waters"Of"The"Danube" 1" 1" 4"
!
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Table B2 continued. Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!" !" !" Treaty" !" Ratifying!Countries"
Num" Scope" Type" Year" Treaty" 1980" 1990" 1999"
23" Global" Lead" 1921" Convention"Concerning"The"Use"Of"White"Lead"In"Painting" 32" 35" 41"
24" Regional" Fish" 1972" Convention"For"The"Conservation"Of"Antarctic"Seals" 9" 12" 15"
25" Regional" Fish" 1982" Convention"For"The"Conservation"Of"Salmon"In"The"North"Atlantic"Ocean" 0" 7" 8"
26" Regional" Fish" 1993" Convention"For"The"Conservation"Of"Southern"Bluefin"Tuna" 0" 0" 3"
27" Regional" Marine" 1989" Convention"For"The"Prohibition"Of"Fishing"With"Long"Driftnets"In"The"South"Pacific" 0" 0" 5"
28" Regional" Marine" 1976" Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Mediterranean"Sea"Against"Pollution" 8" 12" 15"
29" Regional" Nature" 1986" Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Natural"Resources"And"Environment"Of"The"South"Pacific"
Region"
0" 5" 6"
30" Regional" Freshwater" 1976" Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Rhine"Against"Chemical"Pollution" 2" 4" 4"
31" Global" Nuclear" 1986" Convention"On"Early"Notification"Of"A"Nuclear"Accident" 0" 26" 45"
32" Global" Transboundary" 1991" Convention"On"Environmental"Impact"Assessment"In"A"Transboundary"Context" 0" 0" 22"
33" Regional" Fish" 1991" Convention"On"Fisheries"Cooperation"Among"African"States"Bordering"The"Atlantic"Ocean" 0" 0" 7"
34" Regional" Fish" 1973" Convention"On"Fishing"And"Conservation"Of"The"Living"Resources"In"The"Baltic"Sea"And"Belts" 4" 5" 9"
35" Regional" Fish" 1980" Convention"On"Future"Multilateral"Cooperation"In"Northeast"Atlantic"Fisheries" 0" 5" 7"
36" Regional" Fish" 1978" Convention"On"Future"Multilateral"Cooperation"In"The"Northwest"Atlantic"Fisheries" 7" 9" 18"
37" Global" Nature" 1973" Convention"On"International"Trade"In"Endangered"Species"Of"Wild"Fauna"And"Flora" 49" 82" 98"
38" Global" Nuclear" 1994" Convention"On"Nuclear"Safety" 0" 0" 26"
39" Global" Nuclear" 1997" Convention"On"Supplementary"Compensation"For"Nuclear"Damage" 0" 0" 2"
40" Regional" Marine" 1980" Convention"On"The"Conservation"Of"Antarctic"Marine"Living"Resources" 0" 24" 27"
41" Regional" Nature" 1979" Convention"On"The"Conservation"Of"European"Wildlife"And"Natural"Habitats" 1" 17" 29"
42" Global" Nature" 1979" Convention"On"The"Conservation"Of"Migratory"Species"Of"Wild"Animals" 0" 28" 49"
43" Regional" Nature" 1969" Convention"On"The"Conservation"Of"The"Living"Resources"Of"The"Southeast"Atlantic" 9" 12" 13"
44" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1967" Convention"On"The"International"Hydrographic"Organization" 41" 46" 43"
45" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1962" Convention"On"The"Liability"Of"Operators"Of"Nuclear"Ships" 3" 6" 5"
46" Regional" Marine" 1952" Convention"On"The"Organization"Of"The"Permanent"Commission"Of"The"Conference"On"The"
Exploitation"And"Conservation"Of"The"Maritime"Resources"Of"The"South"Pacific"
4" 4" 4"
47" Global" Nuclear" 1980" Convention"On"The"Physical"Protection"Of"Nuclear"Material" 1" 21" 49"
! ! ! ! ! !
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Table B2 continued. Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!" " " !
Treaty"
" !
Ratifying!Countries"
Num" Scope" Type" Year" Treaty" 1980" 1990" 1999"
48" Global" Hazardous"
Materials"
1998" Convention"On"The"Prior"Informed"Consent"Procedure"For"Certain"Hazardous"Chemicals"And"
Pesticides"In"International"Trade"
0" 0" 2"
49" Global" Military" 1977" Convention"On"The"Prohibition"Of"Military"Or"Any"Other"Hostile"Use"Of"Environmental"
Modification"Techniques"
9" 15" 16"
50" Global" Military" 1972" Convention"On"The"Prohibition"Of"The"Development,"Production"And"Stockpiling"Of"
Bacteriological"(Biological)"And"Toxin"Weapons,"And"On"Their"Destruction"
59" 80" 97"
51" Global" Military" 1993" Convention"On"The"Prohibition"Of"The"Development,"Production,"Stockpiling"And"Use"Of"Chemical"
Weapons"And"On"Their"Destruction"
0" 0" 56"
52" Regional" Marine" 1992" Convention"On"The"Protection"Of"The"Black"Sea"Against"Pollution" 0" 0" 6"
53" Regional" Marine" 1974" Convention"On"The"Protection"Of"The"Marine"Environment"Of"The"Baltic"Sea"Area" 4" 4" 7"
54" Regional" Marine" 1992" Convention"On"The"Protection"Of"The"Marine"Environment"Of"The"Baltic"Sea"Area" 0" 0" 6"
55" Regional" Freshwater" 1976" Convention"On"The"Protection"Of"The"Rhine"Against"Pollution"By"Chlorides" 1" 4" 4"
56" Global" Hazardous"
Materials"
1992" Convention"On"The"Transboundary"Effects"Of"Industrial"Accidents" 0" 0" 13"
57" Global" Nature" 1933" Convention"Relative"To"The"Preservation"Of"Fauna"And"Flora"In"Their"Natural"State" 7" 6" 7"
58" Regional" Hazardous"
Materials"
1995" Convention"To"Ban"The"Importation"Into"The"Forum"Island"Countries"Of"Hazardous"And"
Radioactive"Wastes"And"To"Control"The"Transboundary"Movement"And"Management"Of"
Hazardous"Wastes"Within"The"South"Pacific"Region"
0" 0" 3"
59" Regional" Fish" 1983" Eastern"Pacific"Ocean"Tuna"Fishing"Agreement" 0" 4" 4"
60" Regional" Freshwater" 1996" European"Agreement"On"Main"Inland"Waterways"Of"International"Importance" 0" 0" 8"
61" Regional" Freshwater" 1968" European"Agreement"On"The"Restriction"Of"The"Use"Of"Certain"Detergents"In"Washing"And"
Cleaning"Products"
1" 1" 1"
62" Regional" Nature" 1968" European"Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"Animals"During"International"Transport" 14" 17" 19"
63" Regional" Nature" 1979" European"Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"Animals"For"Slaughter" 0" 9" 13"
64" Regional" Nature" 1987" European"Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"Pet"Animals" 0" 2" 10"
65" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1973" International"Convention"For"The"Prevention"Of"Pollution"From"Ships" 7" 13" 20"
66" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1954" International"Convention"For"The"Prevention"Of"Pollution"Of"The"Sea"By"Oil" 41" 50" 52"
67" Global" Nature" 1950" International"Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"Birds" 3" 4" 4"
68" Regional" Nature" 1946" International"Convention"For"The"Regulation"Of"Whaling" 22" 38" 44"
!
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Table B2 continued. Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!" !" !" Treaty" !" Ratifying!Countries"
Num" Scope" Type" Year" Treaty" 1980" 1990" 1999"
69" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1969" International"Convention"On"Civil"Liability"For"Oil"Pollution"Damage" 33" 51" 67"
70" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1971" International"Convention"On"The"Establishment"Of"An"International"Fund"For"Compensation"For"
Oil"Pollution"Damage"
14" 29" 45"
71" Global" Hazardous"
Materials"
1997" Joint"Convention"On"The"Safety"Of"Spent"Fuel"Management"And"On"The"Safety"Of"Radioactive"
Waste"Management"
0" 0" 13"
72" Global" Air" 1987" Montreal"Protocol"On"Substances"That"Deplete"The"Ozone"Layer" 0" 18" 20"
73" Regional" Nature" 1956" Plant"Protection"Agreement"For"The"Southeast"Asia"And"Pacific"Region" 13" 15" 16"
74" Regional" Freshwater" 1991" Protocol"Additional"To"The"Convention"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Rhine"From"Pollution"By"
Chlorides"
0" 0" 4"
75" Regional" Nature" 1977" Protocol"Amending"The"Benelux"Convention"On"The"Hunting"And"Protection"Of"Birds" 1" 1" 1"
76" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1983" Protocol"Amending"The"Convention"For"The"Prevention"Of"Marine"Pollution"By"Dumping"From"
Ships"And"Aircraft"
0" 9" 9"
77" Regional" Freshwater" 1983" Protocol"Amending"The"European"Agreement"On"The"Restriction"Of"The"Use"Of"Certain"
Detergents"In"Washing"And"Cleaning"Products"
0" 4" 4"
78" Regional" Fish" 1952" Protocol"Amending"The"International"Convention"For"The"High"Seas"Fisheries"Of"The"North"Pacific"
Ocean"
0" 0" 1"
79" Regional" Nature" 1985" Protocol"Concerning"Protected"Areas"And"Wild"Fauna"And"Flora"In"The"Eastern"African"Region" 0" 2" 3"
80" Regional" Nature" 1995" Protocol"Concerning"Specially"Protected"Areas"And"Biological"Diversity"In"The"Mediterranean" 0" 0" 6"
81" Global" Nature" 1990" Protocol"Concerning"Specially"Protected"Areas"And"Wildlife" 0" 0" 2"
82" Global" Air" 1991" Protocol"Concerning"The"Control"Of"Emissions"Of"Volatile"Organic"Compounds"Or"Their"
Transboundary"Fluxes"To"The"Convention"On"LongWRange"Transboundary"Air"Pollution"
0" 0" 15"
83" Global" Air" 1988" Protocol"Concerning"The"Control"Of"Nitrogen"Oxides"Or"Their"Transboundary"Fluxes"To"The"
Convention"On"LongWRange"Transboundary"Air"Pollution"
0" 11" 23"
84" Regional" Marine" 1989" Protocol"For"The"Conservation"And"Management"Of"The"Protected"Marine"And"Coastal"Areas"Of"
The"Southeast"Pacific"
0" 0" 2"
85" Regional" Marine" 1976" Protocol"For"The"Prevention"And"Elimination"Of"Pollution"Of"The"Mediterranean"Sea"By"Dumping"
From"Ships"And"Aircraft"
8" 12" 15"
86" Regional" Marine" 1986" Protocol"For"The"Prevention"Of"Pollution"Of"The"South"Pacific"Region"By"Dumping" 0" 4" 5"
87" Regional" Marine" 1980" Protocol"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Mediterranean"Sea"Against"Pollution"From"LandWBased"
Sources"
0" 10" 15"
!
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Table B2 continued. Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!" !" !" Treaty" !" Ratifying!Countries"
Num" Scope" Type" Year" Treaty" 1980" 1990" 1999"
88! Regional! Marine! 1994! Protocol"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Mediterranean"Sea"Against"Pollution"Resulting"From"
Exploration"And"Exploitation"Of"The"Continental"Shelf"And"The"Seabed"And"Its"Subsoil!
0! 0! 2!
89! Regional! Hazardous"
Materials!
1989! Protocol"For"The"Protection"Of"The"Southeast"Pacific"Against"Radioactive"Contamination! 0! 0! 2!
90! Regional! Fish! 1990! Protocol"I"To"The"Convention"For"The"Prohibition"Of"Fishing"With"Long"Driftnets"In"The"South"
Pacific!
0! 0! 1!
91! Regional! Fish! 1990! Protocol"II"To"The"Convention"For"The"Prohibition"Of"Fishing"With"Long"Driftnets"In"The"South"
Pacific!
0! 0! 2!
92! Regional! Nuclear! 1986! Protocol"III"To"The"South"Pacific"Nuclear"Free"Zone"Treaty! 0! 1! 3!
93! Regional! Nature! 1991! Protocol"On"Environmental"Protection"To"The"Antarctic"Treaty! 0! 0! 27!
94" Global" Air" 1994" Protocol"On"Further"Reduction"Of"Sculpture"Emissions"To"The"Convention"On"LongWRange"
Transboundary"Air"Pollution"
0" 0" 19"
95" Global" Air" 1998" Protocol"On"Heavy"Metals"To"The"Convention"On"LongWRange"Transboundary"Air"Pollution" 0" 0" 2"
96" Global" Air" 1998" Protocol"On"Persistent"Organic"Pollutants"To"The"Convention"On"LongWRange"Transboundary"Air"
Pollution"
0" 0" 2"
97" Regional" Fish" 1996" Protocol"On"The"Conservation"Rational"Utilization"And"Management"Of"Norwegian"Spring"
Spawning"Herring"(AtlantoWScandian"Herring)"In"The"Northeast"Atlantic"
0" 0" 3"
98" Regional" Hazardous"
Materials"
1996" Protocol"On"The"Prevention"Of"Pollution"Of"The"Mediterranean"Sea"By"Transboundary"
Movements"Of"Hazardous"Wastes"And"Their"Disposal"
0" 0" 2"
99" Global" Air" 1985" Protocol"On"The"Reduction"Of"Sulfur"Emissions"Or"Their"Transboundary"Fluxes"By"At"Least"30"Per"
Cent"To"The"Convention"On"LongWRange"Transboundary"Air"Pollution"
0" 12" 18"
100" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1992" Protocol"To"Amend"The"International"Convention"On"Civil"Liability"For"Oil"Pollution"Damage" 0" 0" 13"
101" GlobalW
Marine"
Marine" 1992" Protocol"To"Amend"The"International"Convention"On"The"Establishment"Of"An"International"Fund"
For"Compensation"For"Oil"Pollution"Damage"
0" 0" 12"
102" Global" Nuclear" 1997" Protocol"To"Amend"The"Vienna"Convention"On"Civil"Liability"For"Nuclear"Damage" 0" 0" 2"
103" Regional" Fish" 1959" Protocol"To"The"Agreement"Concerning"Measures"For"Protection"Of"The"Stocks"Of"DeepWSea"
Prawns"(Pandalus"Borealis),"European"Lobsters"(Homarus"Vulgaris),"Norway"Lobsters"(Nephrops"
Norveaicus)"And"Crabs"(Cancer"Paqurus)"
3" 3" 3"
104" Global" Air" 1997" Protocol"To"The"United"Nations"Framework"Convention"On"Climate"Change" 0" 0" 11"
105" Regional" Nuclear" 1985" South"Pacific"Nuclear"Free"Zone"Treaty" 0" 4" 4"
!
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Table B2 continued. Treaty list including number of ratifying countries in years 1980, 1990 and 1999 
!" !" !" Treaty" !" Ratifying!Countries"
Num" Scope" Type" Year" Treaty" 1980" 1990" 1999"
106" Global" Nuclear" 1963" Treaty"Banning"Nuclear"Weapon"Tests"In"The"Atmosphere,"In"Outer"Space"And"Under"Water" 2" 2" 2"
107" Regional" Nuclear" 1967" Treaty"For"The"Prohibition"Of"Nuclear"Weapons"In"Latin"America" 22" 23" 27"
108" Global" Nature" 1977" Treaty"On"The"International"Recognition"Of"The"Deposit"Of"Microorganisms"For"The"Purposes"Of"
Patent"Procedure"
5" 18" 39"
109" Global" Nuclear" 1968" Treaty"On"The"NonWProliferation"Of"Nuclear"Weapons" 69" 90" 117"
110" Regional" Nuclear" 1995" Treaty"On"The"Southeast"Asia"Nuclear"Weapon"Free"Zone" 0" 0" 4"
 
!
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